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This commentary critically reviews a recent paper by Baraldi (2004). It shows that results 
obtained there are not robust, and may mot hold after the introduction of minor changes in 
the model structure. It is claimed that this is not a technical point, but relates to the 
fundamental nature of markets with indirect externalities.  
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character. 1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Baraldi (2004) introduces a model in which two market sides are
linked by indirect network externalities. Equilibrium prices and network sizes are de-
rived for a number of alternative market structures. It is found that the equilibrium size
of the network(s) in perfect competition is always greater than the size in monopoly,
for any value of the marginal cost and of the network externality parameter.
This result is not general, as it is strongly dependent on the (rather unrealistic) as-
sumption of symmetry in network externalities. The reason why this outcome does not
generally hold is not a minor technical point. It has to do with some key characteristics
of markets with indirect network externalities, highlighted by several contributions in
the rapidly growing literature on two-sided markets (Roson (2005)).
In this note, Baraldi’s model is brieﬂy summarized. An alternative model variant,
and a counter-example, are subsequently introduced, to show that network size may
actually be larger in monopoly than in perfect competition. A ﬁnal section discusses
why this may be the case, pointing out some interesting implications of market power
and competition in two-sided markets.
2 The Basic Model
There are two symmetric markets (i,j), in which consumers buy at most one unit of
a good, whenever net utility turns out to be positive. The latter is expressed as:
ui = yi   pi + knj (1)
where y (income) is a subjective parameter, uniformously distributed in [0,1], p is
the price of the good i, k is a parameter (equal for both markets) and n refer to the
number of buyers in the opposite market j. The mass of consumers is normalized to
2one, so that 0   ni,nj   1. It is shown that, for given prices:
ni =
1   pi + k(1   pj)
1   k2 (2)
If prices are set by identical ﬁrms competing à la Bertrand, independently in the
two markets, then pi = pj = c, if c is a constant marginal cost, equal for all ﬁrms. In
this case:
ni =
1   c
1   k
(3)
If prices are set by a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist, jointly operating in the two







1   c
2(1   k)
(5)
meaning that network sizes in monopoly (5) are exactly half of those in perfect
competition (3). This ﬁnding may look quite trivial; after all, prices are higher and
quantities are lower in the presence of market power. This type of reasoning is wrong,
however, in the context of two-sided markets, as it will be demonstrated in the follow-
ing section.
Baraldi’s paper continues by considering equilibria with independent (monopolis-
tic) ﬁrms in thetwo markets, ﬁndingthatcomplementaritiesbringabouttoo highprices
andtoo small networks, andthe social optimum,in whichnetworksize exceedsthe one
of perfect competition, because of the existence of a sort of demand-side economies of
scale.
33 A Model Variant and a Counter-Example
Indirect network externalities are almost never symmetric in real markets. For ex-
ample, consumerscare aboutthe numberof merchants acceptingcredit cards, and mer-
chants care about the number of credit card holders, but there is no reason to believe
that these two effects are equally important. Actually, ﬁrms in two sided markets get
most of their proﬁts almost exclusivelyfrom one side only (Evans (2003)), whereas the
other side often get the product for free (e.g., Adobe Reader software), or may be even
subsidized.
Accordingly, let us replace (1) with:
u1 = y1   p1 + kn2
u2 = y2   p2 + xn1
(6)
which, of course, includes Baraldi’s model as a special case (k=x). Following the

















n1 = n2 =
1   c
2   k   x
(9)
Are network sizes as speciﬁed in (7) larger than in (9)? That depends on parame-
ters’ values, and it may not always be the case.
4Tosee this, supposethatc=0.5,k=1.5,x=0. This meansthatindirectnetworkexter-
nalities work one-way: type-1 consumers care about the number of type-2 consumers,
but not vice versa. In a perfect competition setting, p = 0.5, n1 = 1.25, n2 = 0.5.
Proﬁts are zero, by construction. In the monopolisticcase, p1 = 1.5, p2 = 0, so type-2
consumers pay nothing and are cross-subsidized by type-1 consumers. Both network
sizes are equal to 1, and network in market 2 turns out to be larger in monopoly. Proﬁt
is 0.5.
The interpretation is simple. Because the monopolist operates in both markets, she
can internalize network externalities, by setting an appropriate price structure, balanc-
ing the two sides. She then choose not to chargetype-2 consumers,as an indirect mean
of expanding the demand in the main market 1.
Furthermore, market integration always increase proﬁts, and cases of ﬁrms operat-
ing independentlyin the two markets (as considered in most of Baraldi’s paper) are not
natural market conﬁgurations.
4 Discussion
Introducingcompetition,in markets affected by indirect network externalities, may
generate unexpected results. Both a social planner and a two-sided “platform” (e.g. a
credit card network) face the problem of “getting both sides on board”. Rochet and
Tirole (2004) make a useful distinction between exploitation of market power (choice
of an aggregate price level) and the “balancing-act” (choice of a price structure for
the sub-markets). A monopolistic platform balances the two market sides through an
internalization of network externalities. This act is, in principle, in line with social
welfare maximization.
The introduction of competition in a market, for example through the establish-
ment of a duopoly in a formerly monopolistic market, generates two distinct effects: a
reduction of market power held by the incumbent platform(s), and a change in the
5price structure. Relative prices may change because the competitive pressure may
be stronger on one side. However, this translate into a “misalignment introduced by
platform competition between the dominant platform’s objectives and social welfare
maximization” (Hagiu (2004)). Chakravorti and Roson (2004) show, nonetheless, that
the effect of price reduction dominates the change in the price structure, with non-
ambiguous positive effects on welfare, unless market power of the incumbent platform
was already restricted by the nature of the platform (e.g., non-proﬁt, like in Rochet
and Tirole (2002)), or by some other speciﬁc characteristics of the market (e.g., price
regulation).
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